‘Internal Locus of Control’ is, as you are probably well aware, defined as having a focus one how one influences ones circumstances, while versus ‘External Locus of Control’ is having a focus one how ones circumstances influence oneself.

They most probably came from Rotter
The locus of control meta programs are closely related to Rotter’s (1989) distinction bearing the same name. It seems highly likely that this distinction found its way directly from Rotter into the meta program collection. According to Rotter, ‘Locus of control’ describes “the degree to which a person explains outcomes and events in their personal life as due to – chance- fate- luck, or as a result of her/his own – skills- abilities- goal-directed behaviour”. Rotter conceptualised locus of control as variable, based on the circumstances and therefore different in different situations. For instance, situations differ in terms of the clarity of the reinforcement contingencies operating, i.e. how clear it is which behaviour will be rewarded or punished. Clear reinforcement contingencies increase the chance of internal locus of control, while unclear reinforcement contingencies increase the chance of external locus of control.

Social learning theory
Rotter derived the concept from social learning theory (Bandura, 1977). This theory holds that we observe and imitate the behaviour of people around us. Imitation is influenced by the rewards the behaviour is perceived to result in. If the perceived rewards outweigh the perceived costs, then the behaviour will be more likely to be imitated. Therefore, regarding the ‘control’ in Rotters term ‘locus of control’ is control of social reinforcement (being rewarded or punished by ones fellow humans). A logical consequence is, that when reinforcement conditions change, the perceived locus of control may shift as well.

The ‘Internal–External (I-E) scale
Rotter (1966) produced a  29-item questionnaire called the ‘Internal–External (I-E) scale’, measuring to what extent someone believes events are contingent on their own behaviour or their own relatively permanent characteristics or traits (i.e., internal predisposition), or whether they believe that events are contingent on  luck,  chance,  fate,  or  factors beyond their control (i.e., external predisposition). Studies have shown Gurin et al.’s 13-item scale’s validity for measuring the core construct of internal versus external control of reinforcement (Greenberger, Strasser, Cummings,  & Dunham, 1989; Howell & Avolio, 1993).

In this measurement, respondents are presented with 13 sets of two statements and asked to choose the one describing best how they feel. 1. Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luckPeople’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.2. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don’t take enough interest in politics.There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.3. In the long run, people get the respect they deserve in this world.Unfortunately, an individual’s worth often passes unrecognised no matter how hard he tries.4. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.Most students don’t realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.5. Without the right breaks, one cannot be an effective leader.Capable people who fail to became leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.6. No matter how hard you try, some people just don’t like you.People who can’t get others to like them don’t understand how to get along with others.7. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.8. In the case of the well prepared student, there is rarely, if ever, such a thing as an unfair test.Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really useless.9. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work; luck has little or nothing to do with it.Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.10. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.11. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of luck anyway.12. In my case, getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.13. What happens to me is my own doing.Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction my life is taking.

Looking at these statements, we see that 7 sets refer to having control over specific types of reward or punishment, while 6 items refer to general events:Specific itemsSet 2: Having warsSet 3: Receiving respect and recognitionSet 4: Receiving good grades as a studentSet 5: Becoming a leaderSet 6: People liking youSet 8: Being tested fairly as a studentSet 10: Influencing government decisionsGeneral itemsSet 1: Having bad luck and misfortuneSet 7: What is going to happenSet 9: Having successSet 11: Making plans workSet 12: Getting what I wantSet 13: What happens to me

Comparison with Rotters ‘Locus of control’
a. Conceptually, the meta program set ‘Internal’ versus ‘External locus of control’ is almost identical to Rotters ‘Locus of control’. Although we have no evidence of this, it seems likely that this meta program set was derived directly from Rotters work.

b. Both Rotter and meta programs assume that locus of control may vary depending on the context.c. In the short form of his measurement, the ‘Internal–External (I-E) scale’, Rotter defines 7 specific contexts (in 7 out of the 13 items). This is a difference with meta programs, since MindSonar only uses one single context (chosen by the respondent or the organisation using MindSonar).d. The definition of the meta program set may benefit from Rotters specification of three sources of internal and external locus of control each. Rotter mentions “chance, fate and luck” as sources of external locus of control and “skills, abilities and goal-directed behaviour” as sources of internal locus of control.

Skill, ability, chance and fate
Although these sources are almost synonymous, they are not exactly the same. ‘Skill’ refers to a specific ability, a specific expertise. ‘Ability’ is a more general concept: proficiency in a particular area (which may be made up of multiple skills and a mental strategy to manage them). ‘Goal-directed behaviour’ is more specific than ‘skill’, it might even refer to a single action. These three sources are on a general-to-specific continuum: ability – skill- goal-directed behaviour.

Looking at the sources of external locus of control, we see that ‘chance’ is the occurrence of events in the absence of any obvious intention or cause. This is a broad concept that does not even attribute the cause of the events to any outside forces either. ‘Fate’ is when events are predetermined by a supernatural power, which is outside a person’s control. ‘Fate’ is a little more specific that ‘chance’; fate at least contributes the events to something. ‘Luck’ is when success or failure are apparently brought by chance rather than through one’s own actions. Luck is more specific again than chance, it’s not about events in general, but about success or failure. With his specification of the courts, Rotter covers both general and (a little) more specific reasons for where the perceived control lies.

As you probably know, the meta program ‘options’ is defined as a preference for having many different possibilities, while its counterpart ‘procedure’ is characterised by a preference to use step-by-step plans. These meta programs are related to the ‘Rule/group conformity’ and the ‘Sufficiency/proliferation of originality’ subscales of  the ‘Kirton Adaption–Innovation (AI) continuum of cognitive style’ (Kirton, 1987) as well as the distinction between ‘judging’ and ‘perceiving’ in Myer’s addition to Jung’s theory of psychological types (Geyer, 1995).

Kirton: Adaption versus innovation
Kirton describes adaptors as “conforming to the established procedures or ways of doing things – these established procedures represent the step-by-step planning which is learned by experience and guidelines and is the opposite of seeing possibilities and aiming for change”. Adaptors also seek collaboration in problem solving and conform to rules and groups (personal or informal structures). Innovators seek new and unique ways (which also means new possibilities) and are not likely to pay attention to tradition and consensus but are more likely to break the rules and make unexpected decisions. Items in the Kirton Adaption–Innovation inventory that measure rule/group conformity are (Kirton, 1976):
20. Imposes strict order on matters with their control
21. Fits readily into “the system”
22. Conforms
23. Readily agrees with the team at work
24. Never seeks to bend or break the rules
25. Never acts without proper authority
26. Is prudent when dealing with authority
27. Likes the protection of precise instructions
28. Is predictable
29. Prefers colleagues who never “rock the boat”
30. Likes bosses and work patterns which are consistent.
31. Works without deviation in a prescribed way
32. Holds back ideas until obviously needed.

Items in the Kirton Adaption–Innovation inventory that measure ‘sufficiency/proliferation of originality’ are (Kirton, 1976):
1. Has original ideas
2. Proliferates ideas
3. Is stimulating
4. Copes with several new ideas at the time
5. Will always think of something when stuck
6. Would sooner create than improve
7. Has fresh perspectives on old problems
8. Often risks doing things differently
9. Likes to vary set routines at a moment’s notice
10. Prefers to work on one problem the time
11. Can stand out in disagreement with the group
12. Need the stimulation of frequent change
13. Prefers changes to occur gradually

Psychological types: judging versus perceiving
Jung distinguished 8 psychological types. He theorised that the dominant function in these types (extraverted/ introverted and sensing/intuition/ thinking/feeling) characterises consciousness, while its opposite is repressed and characterises unconscious behaviour (Jung, 1933). The judging/perceiving distinction, which was added later to Jung’s original types by Myer, reflects whether a person relies primarily on a judging process (thinking or feeling) or a perceiving process (sensing or intuition) in their decision making and other dealings with the outer world.

The ‘judging’ type likes to make plans and to-do-lists.
The ‘perceiving’ type likes to stay open to the outer world (to new experiences and information).

‘Judging’ people are decisive, self-starters and self-regimented. They also focus on completing the task, knowing the essentials, and they take action quickly. They plan their work and work their plan. Deadlines are sacred as they see time as a finite resource. They want guides that give quick tips.

‘Perceiving’ people are curious, adaptable, and spontaneous. They start many tasks, want to know everything about each task, and often find it difficult to complete a task. Deadlines are meant to be stretched while more information is gathered as they see time as a renewable resource. They like to leave their options open. (Clark. 2011).

Comparison
When we compare the options and procedure meta programs with Kirton’s ‘rule/group conformity’ and ‘sufficiency/proliferation of originality’ subscale’ and with the distinction between ‘judging’ and ‘perceiving’ in Myers-Briggs, we see the following similarities and differences:

a. When Kirton describes adaptors as liking “established procedures” and “step-by-step planning” he is literally describing what we understand the meta program ‘procedure’ to mean. Likewise, his description of innovators as “seeking new and unique ways (which also means new possibilities)” is a direct description op the meta program ‘options’. So here we see a strong similarity.

b. When we look at the items in Kirton’s rule/group conformity subscale, we see that 7 items are a direct reflection of the meta program procedure (items 20, 24, 27,28, 29, 30 and 31). The other 5 items, however, reflect the meta program ‘external reference’ rather than ‘procedure’ (items 21, 22, 23, 26, and 32). From a meta program perspective, this subscale consists of 58% ‘procedure’ and 42% ‘external reference’. It looks like in the ‘rule/group conformity’ concept, the ‘rule’ element is ‘procedure’, while the ‘group’ element is ‘external reference’.

c. When we look at the items in Kirton’s ‘sufficiency/proliferation of originality’ subscale, we see that 7 items are a direct reflection of the meta program ‘options’ (items 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). The other 6 items in this subscale, however, mostly reflect other meta programs. Item 11 reflects ‘internal reference’ and item 12 reflects ‘change’, while item 13 reflects ‘development’. From a meta program perspective, this subscale consists of 54% options and 46% other meta programs.c. As we mentioned before, another difference is that Kirton limits the context for his cognitive styles to working situations, while meta programs may pertain to any context.Summarising: The rule/group conformity subscale in the Kirton Adaption-Innovation continuum is a direct reflection of the meta program ‘procedure’ for about half the scale. The other half of the scale reflects ‘external reference’. Similarly, the ‘sufficiency/proliferation of originality’ subscale is a direct reflection of the meta program ‘options’ for about half the scale. The other half of the scale reflects other meta programs.a.

When we view Myer’s ‘judging’ versus ‘perceiving’ psychological types,

a. We see that the ‘judging’ type
– likes to make plans and to-do-lists
– is self-starting and self-regimented
– focuses on completing the task- plans their work and works their plan
– adheres to deadlines
– wants guides.
These are all expressions of the meta program ‘procedure’.

b. The ‘perceiving’ type
– likes to stay open to new experiences and information
– starts many tasks- often finds it difficult to complete a task
– does not adhere to deadlines
– likes to leave their options open.T
hese are all expressions of the meta program ‘options’

c. The ‘judging’ versus ‘perceiving’ distinction does not, however, reflect the ‘procedure’ versus ‘options’ meta programs exclusively.
– ‘Knowing the essentials’ (judging) reflects the meta program ‘concept’.
– ‘Taking action quickly’ (judging) reflects the meta program ‘proactive’.
– ‘Wanting to know everything about each task’ (perceiving) reflects the meta programs ‘information’ and ‘ specific’.

Summarising: To a fairly large extent the ‘judging’ versus ‘perceiving’ psychological types overlap with the meta programs ‘procedure’ versus ‘options’. However, these types also contain other meta programs as well, like ‘concept’, ‘proactive’, ‘information’ and ‘specific’.

As you know, the meta program ‘internal reference’ is defined as: using one’s own standards in evaluations. ‘External reference’ is using other people’s standards in evaluations. What are some concepts from mainstream science that this distinction is related to?

Internal and external frames of reference in the academic self-concept
An ‘Internal/External frame of reference’-concept used in the study of academic self-concept (Marsh, 1986). When students gauge their academic self-concept by comparing their ability in a given area with the ability of their peers, this is called ‘external comparison’. When they compare their ability in one area with they own ability in other areas, that is called ‘internal comparison’.

Adaptation/Innovation
The meta programs internal reference and external reference, are also related to the ‘Kirton Adaption–Innovation (AI) continuum’ of cognitive style (Kirton, 1987). Messick (1976) defines cognitive style broadly as “consistent individual differences in preferred ways of organising and processing information and experience” (p. 5). Kirton (1999b) defines cognitive style more narrowly as the preferred style with which the individual undertakes problem solving and creativity. He asserts that cognitive style is highly resistant to change. The Kirton Adaption-Innovation (AI) continuum of cognitive style ranges from more adaptive preferences for creativity, decision making, and problem solving at one end, to more innovative preferences at the other. Kirton (1994) describes people with more adaptive preferences as being seen by others as more precise, sound, reliable, disciplined, and dependable. They are more concerned about how things get done – the means. They tend to accept the given problem definition and are more concerned with resolving problems rather than finding them. People with more adaptive preferences will generally focus on change that promotes incremental improvement, perfecting existing systems or “doing things better.” Kirton (1994) described those with a more innovative preference as being seen as unique, visionary, and ingenious. Those with a more innovative preference prefer to challenge the definition of the problem by manipulating and questioning existing assumptions. They may be seen as undisciplined and the kind of change on which they focus is perceived as more radical and often described as breakthrough. When these characteristics are operating together, more innovative people will generally prefer changing the existing system or “doing things differently.”

Focussing on others, but doing what?
When we compare the internal and external reference meta programs with Marshes (1986) Internal/External frame of reference and the Kirton Adaption-Innovation continuum, we see the following similarities and differences.

a. What the internal/external reference distinction in meta programs shares with Marshes Internal/External frame of reference model, is that in both distinctions there is a focus on self (internal reference) in one case, versus a focus on others (external reference) in the other.

b. There is also an important difference. In a comparison there are two elements: observation and evaluation. When a student compares themselves with their peers in Marshes model, they are observing others. But when they evaluate their own capability, comparing themselves with these others, they are using their own standards. If they were displaying the meta program ‘external reference’ in that situation, they would be using the standards of their peers. They would be measuring their own performance against what their peers found to be a good standard, not even necessarily observing the ability of their peers.

Summarising: Both Marshes internal/external frame of reference-concept and the internal/external reference meta programs distinguish – in a broad sense – between focus on self and focus on others. A major difference is that in Marshes model people using an external frame of reference use their own standards to evaluate their performance, while with the external referenced meta program they use the other person’s standards.

Many other meta programs in Kirton’s AI distinction

c. Looking at the Kirton Adaption–Innovation continuum, people with adaptive preferences, certainly sound more externally referenced, while people with innovative preferences clearly seem more internally referenced in terms of meta programs. Adaptive preferences are characterised by “accepting the given problem definition”. In that regard they are externally referenced: accepting the judgement of other as to what the problem is. People with innovative preferences are described as challenging the definition of the problem … and questioning existing assumptions. These are definitely internally referenced qualities.

d. But as with other concepts we have discussed in this series, Kirton’s adaptive and innovative preferences also harbour many elements that would be coded as other meta programs.
– ‘Being precise’ would be coded as ‘specific’
– ‘Reliable and disciplined’ would be coded as ‘procedure’
– ‘Undisciplined’ would be coded as ‘options’
– ‘Concerned about how things get done’ would be coded as ‘procedure’ too
– ‘Resolving problems’ would be coded as ‘away from’
– ‘Incremental improvement’ would be coded as ‘development’
– ‘Radical change’ would be coded as ‘change’
– ‘Visionary’ would be coded as ’change plus general plus visual’.
So apart from the internal/external reference distinction, Kirton’s distinction also seems to make use of the ‘general/specific’, ‘options/procedure’ and ‘maintenance/development/change’ meta programs.

e. Another difference is that Kirton sees cognitive style as ‘highly resistant to change’, while meta programs are presupposed to be different in different contexts, which also presupposes that they may often change quite easily.

Summarising: We recognise internal/external reference elements in Kirtons adaptive/innovative distinction. Apart from these two meta programs, we also recognise several other meta program distinctions, like ‘general/specific’ and ‘options/procedure’.

Meta programs and personality theories
Meta programs are assumed to be variable depending on the situation. This is quite different from ‘personality’ which is supposed to be stable over time and contexts. Lately I have been starting to wonder whether the whole concept of personality isn’t doing us more harm than good. But that is something I will address elsewhere. All I will say here is: give uncle John four glasses of whiskey and see how stable his ‘personality’ is…

In spite of all this, meta programs  show similarities with types or traits or factors from personality theories. When we are looking for relationships between meta programs and concepts in mainstream science, we end up, whether we like it or not,  in the realm of personality.

Clarification by contrast
The good thing is, that when we describe the similarities and differences between meta programs and personality- or behaviour traits, we clarify the definition of our meta program concepts by contrast. I have started to do that for a scientific article on MindSonar.

Theory, concept, measurement
Why is this clarification even necessary? When we want to communicate with the scientific world, we need to explain where our concepts (meta programs, in our case) come from. The scientific model for psychological measurement is: 1. You have a theory, 2. From this theory you derive traits or qualities, 3. You measure those, 4. You use statistics to evaluate how well you are measuring your concepts.

For instance: your theory is that eating a lot of sugar makes people nervous. From this theory you derive the concept of ‘nervousness’. And then you devise an instrument, like a questionnaire, that measures this ‘nervousness’. If your measurement doesn’t work well (judging from the statistics), you go back to the theory for ideas on how to improve it.

NLP is no theory
And here we run into an obstacle: NLP is not a theory. NLP is a collection of presuppositions, skills and techniques. These were derived by observing effective therapists, not from studying scientific research. So when we want to communicate with scientists, we have no theory that connects our concepts and shows us why these concepts are important.

The origins of the Graves concepts are clear, the origins of the meta program concepts have been largely lost in the mists of time. In NLP, sequences of sensory experiences (‘inner strategies’) were originally referred to as mental ‘programming’. Sometimes patterns common to several different inner strategies of the same person were noted during change work. These distinctions were ‘meta’ to mental programming, hence the name ‘meta programs’. The NLP literature does not offer any theories with explicit definitions of these distinctions or statements as to why they are important, how they fit together or what other concepts they are related to. It is my impression that these are distinctions that were popular in the therapy and personal growth culture of California in the 1980’s. They could be said to represent ‘crowd wisdom’ from that era. They were assimilated into NLP by Bandler and later formalised by Cameron-Bandler (1985).

Explaining how meta programs are similar and different
So we cannot point to any theory to explain why we think meta programs are important and useful distinctions. But what we can do, in order to communicate with scientists, is to take concepts from mainstream science and explain how meta programs are similar to and different from these known concepts. As I mentioned, these concepts are mainly personality traits.

Proactive
Let’s have a look at Proactive versus Reactive. There is actually something in mainstream science called ‘proactive behavior’. So this is our obvious starting point. Bateman and Crant (1999) describe a type of behaviour they call ‘proactive’, defined as: ‘to intentionally and directly change things in an intended direction’. They also describe the lack of this proactive behaviour, but they do not give it a label. Similarities and differences with the proactive/reactive dimension in meta programs are:

Comparison with mainstream ideas about proactivity
– Both Bateman and Crant and meta programs highlight taking the initiative as an important element of proactivity.

– Bateman and Crant focus on behaviour, meta programs focus on thinking style (patterns of cognition and experience).

– In their definition, Bateman and Crant include the result of the behavior: ‘change things for the better’. Meta programs do not assume that proactive behaviour will change things for the better. Proactive behaviour may change things for the worse. Think of someone who quickly lights a fire to get warm and doing so, sets the house on fire.

– Bateman and Crant include several behaviors under ‘proactivity’ that in meta programs are considered to be expressions of other meta programs:

a. ‘Scanning for (…) opportunities’ would be coded in meta programs as ‘Options’, not necessary proactive. Someone may scan for opportunities in their mind without ever acting upon them.

b. ‘Setting effective change-oriented goals’ would be coded as ‘Towards’ and ‘Change’ in terms of meta programs. Someone may be aware of what they would like to change, without ever acting upon those ideas.

c.’To do different things or do things differently’ would be coded as an effect of the ‘Change’ or ‘Development’ meta programs.

– Bateman and Crant seem to strongly favour proactivity over ‘no proactivity’. In meta programs, the opposite of ‘Proactive’ is ‘Reactive’: needing more time and information before starting an activity. Meta programs assume there are advantages to reactivity in many situations, be they private or work place. Proactive spending f.i., may bankrupt a company, which could have been prevented by reactive thinking.

– Summarizing: Both Bateman and Crant and meta programs highlight taking the initiative as an important element of proactivity. Differences are: Bateman and Crant focus on behavior, include the result of the action and seem to strongly favour proactivity. Meta programs, in contract, focus on thinking, do not include the result of the action and favour proactivity and reactivity equally. Also Bateman and Crant include many elements in their definition that are covered by meta programs other than ‘Proactive/Reactive’.

The Big Five
The five-factor model, or Big Five model, is a trait oriented personality typology, based on relationships within descriptors of common language. It suggests five broad dimensions commonly used to describe the human personality (Saucier and Goldberg, 1996). The five factors are:

1. Openness to experience (inventive/curious vs. consistent/cautious).

2. Conscientiousness (efficient/organised vs. easy-going/careless).

3. Extraversion (outgoing/energetic vs. solitary/reserved).

4. Agreeableness (friendly/compassionate vs. challenging/detached).

5. Neuroticism (sensitive/nervous vs. secure/confident).

Extraversion
Of the Big Five, the ‘Extraversion/Introversion’ factor seems most strongly related to the ‘Proactive/Reactive’ meta program. This factor is defined as: “The tendency to seek stimulation in the company of others, and talkativeness. Low extraversion causes a reserved, reflective personality. Extroverts draw energy from interacting with others, while introverts get tired from interacting with others and replenish their energy from solitude. People high in extroversion are comfortable with others, gregarious, and prone to action rather than contemplation (Lebowitz, 2016a). People low in extraversion are more likely to speak less, be quiet, introspective, reserved, and thoughtful.”

The traits associated with extraversion are:SociableAssertiveMerryOutgoingEnergeticTalkativeArticulateFun-lovingAffectionateFriendlySocially confident

– Both the ‘Extraversion/Introversion’ factor and the ‘Proactive’ and ‘Reactive’ meta programs define Introverted/Reactive as more introspective and thoughtful. Big Five theory would by contrast see Extraverted as less introspective and less thoughtful as do meta programs.

– Both typologies see ‘Extraverted/Proactive’ as prone to action rather than contemplation, and consequently ‘Introverted/Reactive’ as prone to contemplation rather than action.

– Both typologies see Extraverted/Proactive as drawing energy from overtly doing something (interacting with others, in the case of Big Five).

– A difference is, that the ‘Extraversion/Introversion’ factor is focussed on one single context: social interaction, while the meta programs ‘Proactive’ and ‘Reactive’ may be applied to any context. Opening a door, to give one non-social example, may be done proactively (by immediately turning the handle or kicking the door) or reactively (by first thinking about the way the lock works and what might be behind the door).

– Another difference is that, when we look at the list of traits that are part of extraversion, there are several traits that would be coded as different meta programs. ‘Sociable’ would be not be coded as ‘Proactive’ but rather as the meta program ‘People’. ’Friendly’ would be coded as the meta programs ‘Matching plus People’.’Merry’ would be coded as ‘Matching plus Kinesthetic’. ‘Assertive’ would be coded as ’Proactive plus Towards plus Internally Referenced’. This set of traits being part of the ‘Extraversion’ dimension, makes it much less specific than the meta program ‘Proactive’.

– Summarising
Both ‘Extraverted’ and ‘Proactive’ are characterised by being prone to action, and their opposites ‘Introverted’ and ‘Reactive’ as being prone to contemplation. A difference is that ‘Introversion’ contains a broad set of traits that are covered by other meta programs (or meta program combinations) than ‘Proactive/Reactive’.