‘Options’ versus ‘Procedure’, is it the same as ‘Judging’ versus ‘Perceiving’?

As you probably know, the meta program ‘options’ is defined as a preference for having many different possibilities, while its counterpart ‘procedure’ is characterised by a preference to use step-by-step plans. These meta programs are related to the ‘Rule/group conformity’ and the ‘Sufficiency/proliferation of originality’ subscales of  the ‘Kirton Adaption–Innovation (AI) continuum of cognitive style’ (Kirton, 1987) as well as the distinction between ‘judging’ and ‘perceiving’ in Myer’s addition to Jung’s theory of psychological types (Geyer, 1995).

Kirton: Adaption versus innovation
Kirton describes adaptors as “conforming to the established procedures or ways of doing things – these established procedures represent the step-by-step planning which is learned by experience and guidelines and is the opposite of seeing possibilities and aiming for change”. Adaptors also seek collaboration in problem solving and conform to rules and groups (personal or informal structures). Innovators seek new and unique ways (which also means new possibilities) and are not likely to pay attention to tradition and consensus but are more likely to break the rules and make unexpected decisions. Items in the Kirton Adaption–Innovation inventory that measure rule/group conformity are (Kirton, 1976):
20. Imposes strict order on matters with their control
21. Fits readily into “the system”
22. Conforms
23. Readily agrees with the team at work
24. Never seeks to bend or break the rules
25. Never acts without proper authority
26. Is prudent when dealing with authority
27. Likes the protection of precise instructions
28. Is predictable
29. Prefers colleagues who never “rock the boat”
30. Likes bosses and work patterns which are consistent.
31. Works without deviation in a prescribed way
32. Holds back ideas until obviously needed.

Items in the Kirton Adaption–Innovation inventory that measure ‘sufficiency/proliferation of originality’ are (Kirton, 1976):
1. Has original ideas
2. Proliferates ideas
3. Is stimulating
4. Copes with several new ideas at the time
5. Will always think of something when stuck
6. Would sooner create than improve
7. Has fresh perspectives on old problems
8. Often risks doing things differently
9. Likes to vary set routines at a moment’s notice
10. Prefers to work on one problem the time
11. Can stand out in disagreement with the group
12. Need the stimulation of frequent change
13. Prefers changes to occur gradually

Psychological types: judging versus perceiving
Jung distinguished 8 psychological types. He theorised that the dominant function in these types (extraverted/ introverted and sensing/intuition/ thinking/feeling) characterises consciousness, while its opposite is repressed and characterises unconscious behaviour (Jung, 1933). The judging/perceiving distinction, which was added later to Jung’s original types by Myer, reflects whether a person relies primarily on a judging process (thinking or feeling) or a perceiving process (sensing or intuition) in their decision making and other dealings with the outer world.

The ‘judging’ type likes to make plans and to-do-lists.
The ‘perceiving’ type likes to stay open to the outer world (to new experiences and information).

‘Judging’ people are decisive, self-starters and self-regimented. They also focus on completing the task, knowing the essentials, and they take action quickly. They plan their work and work their plan. Deadlines are sacred as they see time as a finite resource. They want guides that give quick tips.

‘Perceiving’ people are curious, adaptable, and spontaneous. They start many tasks, want to know everything about each task, and often find it difficult to complete a task. Deadlines are meant to be stretched while more information is gathered as they see time as a renewable resource. They like to leave their options open. (Clark. 2011).

Comparison
When we compare the options and procedure meta programs with Kirton’s ‘rule/group conformity’ and ‘sufficiency/proliferation of originality’ subscale’ and with the distinction between ‘judging’ and ‘perceiving’ in Myers-Briggs, we see the following similarities and differences:

a. When Kirton describes adaptors as liking “established procedures” and “step-by-step planning” he is literally describing what we understand the meta program ‘procedure’ to mean. Likewise, his description of innovators as “seeking new and unique ways (which also means new possibilities)” is a direct description op the meta program ‘options’. So here we see a strong similarity.

b. When we look at the items in Kirton’s rule/group conformity subscale, we see that 7 items are a direct reflection of the meta program procedure (items 20, 24, 27,28, 29, 30 and 31). The other 5 items, however, reflect the meta program ‘external reference’ rather than ‘procedure’ (items 21, 22, 23, 26, and 32). From a meta program perspective, this subscale consists of 58% ‘procedure’ and 42% ‘external reference’. It looks like in the ‘rule/group conformity’ concept, the ‘rule’ element is ‘procedure’, while the ‘group’ element is ‘external reference’.

c. When we look at the items in Kirton’s ‘sufficiency/proliferation of originality’ subscale, we see that 7 items are a direct reflection of the meta program ‘options’ (items 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). The other 6 items in this subscale, however, mostly reflect other meta programs. Item 11 reflects ‘internal reference’ and item 12 reflects ‘change’, while item 13 reflects ‘development’. From a meta program perspective, this subscale consists of 54% options and 46% other meta programs.c. As we mentioned before, another difference is that Kirton limits the context for his cognitive styles to working situations, while meta programs may pertain to any context.Summarising: The rule/group conformity subscale in the Kirton Adaption-Innovation continuum is a direct reflection of the meta program ‘procedure’ for about half the scale. The other half of the scale reflects ‘external reference’. Similarly, the ‘sufficiency/proliferation of originality’ subscale is a direct reflection of the meta program ‘options’ for about half the scale. The other half of the scale reflects other meta programs.a.

When we view Myer’s ‘judging’ versus ‘perceiving’ psychological types,

a. We see that the ‘judging’ type
– likes to make plans and to-do-lists
– is self-starting and self-regimented
– focuses on completing the task- plans their work and works their plan
– adheres to deadlines
– wants guides.
These are all expressions of the meta program ‘procedure’.

b. The ‘perceiving’ type
– likes to stay open to new experiences and information
– starts many tasks- often finds it difficult to complete a task
– does not adhere to deadlines
– likes to leave their options open.T
hese are all expressions of the meta program ‘options’

c. The ‘judging’ versus ‘perceiving’ distinction does not, however, reflect the ‘procedure’ versus ‘options’ meta programs exclusively.
– ‘Knowing the essentials’ (judging) reflects the meta program ‘concept’.
– ‘Taking action quickly’ (judging) reflects the meta program ‘proactive’.
– ‘Wanting to know everything about each task’ (perceiving) reflects the meta programs ‘information’ and ‘ specific’.

Summarising: To a fairly large extent the ‘judging’ versus ‘perceiving’ psychological types overlap with the meta programs ‘procedure’ versus ‘options’. However, these types also contain other meta programs as well, like ‘concept’, ‘proactive’, ‘information’ and ‘specific’.

Internal and External Reference, what is the Link with Innovation?

As you know, the meta program ‘internal reference’ is defined as: using one’s own standards in evaluations. ‘External reference’ is using other people’s standards in evaluations. What are some concepts from mainstream science that this distinction is related to?

Internal and external frames of reference in the academic self-concept
An ‘Internal/External frame of reference’-concept used in the study of academic self-concept (Marsh, 1986). When students gauge their academic self-concept by comparing their ability in a given area with the ability of their peers, this is called ‘external comparison’. When they compare their ability in one area with they own ability in other areas, that is called ‘internal comparison’.

Adaptation/Innovation
The meta programs internal reference and external reference, are also related to the ‘Kirton Adaption–Innovation (AI) continuum’ of cognitive style (Kirton, 1987). Messick (1976) defines cognitive style broadly as “consistent individual differences in preferred ways of organising and processing information and experience” (p. 5). Kirton (1999b) defines cognitive style more narrowly as the preferred style with which the individual undertakes problem solving and creativity. He asserts that cognitive style is highly resistant to change. The Kirton Adaption-Innovation (AI) continuum of cognitive style ranges from more adaptive preferences for creativity, decision making, and problem solving at one end, to more innovative preferences at the other. Kirton (1994) describes people with more adaptive preferences as being seen by others as more precise, sound, reliable, disciplined, and dependable. They are more concerned about how things get done – the means. They tend to accept the given problem definition and are more concerned with resolving problems rather than finding them. People with more adaptive preferences will generally focus on change that promotes incremental improvement, perfecting existing systems or “doing things better.” Kirton (1994) described those with a more innovative preference as being seen as unique, visionary, and ingenious. Those with a more innovative preference prefer to challenge the definition of the problem by manipulating and questioning existing assumptions. They may be seen as undisciplined and the kind of change on which they focus is perceived as more radical and often described as breakthrough. When these characteristics are operating together, more innovative people will generally prefer changing the existing system or “doing things differently.”

Focussing on others, but doing what?
When we compare the internal and external reference meta programs with Marshes (1986) Internal/External frame of reference and the Kirton Adaption-Innovation continuum, we see the following similarities and differences.

a. What the internal/external reference distinction in meta programs shares with Marshes Internal/External frame of reference model, is that in both distinctions there is a focus on self (internal reference) in one case, versus a focus on others (external reference) in the other.

b. There is also an important difference. In a comparison there are two elements: observation and evaluation. When a student compares themselves with their peers in Marshes model, they are observing others. But when they evaluate their own capability, comparing themselves with these others, they are using their own standards. If they were displaying the meta program ‘external reference’ in that situation, they would be using the standards of their peers. They would be measuring their own performance against what their peers found to be a good standard, not even necessarily observing the ability of their peers.

Summarising: Both Marshes internal/external frame of reference-concept and the internal/external reference meta programs distinguish – in a broad sense – between focus on self and focus on others. A major difference is that in Marshes model people using an external frame of reference use their own standards to evaluate their performance, while with the external referenced meta program they use the other person’s standards.

Many other meta programs in Kirton’s AI distinction

c. Looking at the Kirton Adaption–Innovation continuum, people with adaptive preferences, certainly sound more externally referenced, while people with innovative preferences clearly seem more internally referenced in terms of meta programs. Adaptive preferences are characterised by “accepting the given problem definition”. In that regard they are externally referenced: accepting the judgement of other as to what the problem is. People with innovative preferences are described as challenging the definition of the problem … and questioning existing assumptions. These are definitely internally referenced qualities.

d. But as with other concepts we have discussed in this series, Kirton’s adaptive and innovative preferences also harbour many elements that would be coded as other meta programs.
– ‘Being precise’ would be coded as ‘specific’
– ‘Reliable and disciplined’ would be coded as ‘procedure’
– ‘Undisciplined’ would be coded as ‘options’
– ‘Concerned about how things get done’ would be coded as ‘procedure’ too
– ‘Resolving problems’ would be coded as ‘away from’
– ‘Incremental improvement’ would be coded as ‘development’
– ‘Radical change’ would be coded as ‘change’
– ‘Visionary’ would be coded as ’change plus general plus visual’.
So apart from the internal/external reference distinction, Kirton’s distinction also seems to make use of the ‘general/specific’, ‘options/procedure’ and ‘maintenance/development/change’ meta programs.

e. Another difference is that Kirton sees cognitive style as ‘highly resistant to change’, while meta programs are presupposed to be different in different contexts, which also presupposes that they may often change quite easily.

Summarising: We recognise internal/external reference elements in Kirtons adaptive/innovative distinction. Apart from these two meta programs, we also recognise several other meta program distinctions, like ‘general/specific’ and ‘options/procedure’.

Towards and Away from, what does Motivational Theory say?

This is an article in the series on comparisons between meta programs and concepts in mainstream science. Today we will talk about ‘towards’ versus ‘away from’. As you probably know, the meta program ‘Towards’ is defined as a focus on achieving goals, while its opposite ‘Away From’ is defined as a  focus on avoiding problems.

Approach and avoidance
Concepts related to ‘Towards/Away from thinking’ are ‘Approach/Avoidance’ motivation and ‘Goal Achievement Motivation’. Both have a long history in science. Models of Goal Achievement Motivation tend to offer a more fine grained view of motivation than the simple ‘Towards’ versus ‘Away from’ distinction. Although Atkinson (1957) does remark that “achievement motivation and fear of failure may be defined simply as the generalised desire to succeed and the generalised desire to avoid failure, respectively”. So theoretically speaking it looks like we have the basics covered with our meta programs.

Democritus
The distinction between approach and avoidance motivation can be found in ancient Greek philosophy. The ethical hedonism of Democritus (460-370 BC) and Aristippus (430-360 BC) proscribed the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the primary guide for human conduct (Elliot, 1999). In psychology, few phenomena are more fundamental than approach and avoidance motivations, which have been implicated in a wide range of psychological processes (e.g., Cacioppo 1999; Elliot & Church, 1997; Higgins, 1997) and are shared across a diverse array of species (Elliot, 1999).Approach and avoidance motivation “is composed of three … components. Approach indicates a propensity to move toward (or maintain contact with) a desired stimulus. Avoidance indicates a propensity to move away from (or maintain distance from) an undesired stimulus. Motivation is defined as the energization and direction of behavior. The valence of stimuli is at the core of the distinction between approach and avoidance, with positively valenced stimuli typically leading to approach and negatively valenced stimuli typically leading to avoidance. Stimuli can be external or internal, implicit or explicit, conscious or non-conscious.” (Seel, 2012).

Hierarchical models
Goal Achievement Motivation is often seen as having two hierarchical levels. In the beginning of the last century McDougal (1908, 1932) linked specific ‘Desired goals’ to more generalised ‘Preferences’ (initially called ‘instincts’). Personality theorists later proposed hierarchical models of motivation in which goal concepts (Pervin, 1989) are seen as concrete representations of more abstract ‘motivational dispositions’ (Cattell, 1957; Emmons, 1989; McClelland, 1951; Murray, 1938; Nuttin, 1984; Rotter, 1954). In this tradition, goal concepts are situated between global motivational dispositions and specific behaviors. Goal concepts are the direct regulators of behaviour, and motivational dispositions have an indirect influence.

The difference between performance and mastery
Later motivation theorists (Elliot, 1994, 1997, Elliot and Church, 1997) have taken into account the distinction between ‘performance motivation’ and ‘mastery motivation’. In setting performance goals, people focus on demonstrating their competence to others. In setting mastery goals, they focus on improving their competence for the sake of feeling competent. Combining approach/avoidance motivation with performance/mastery motivation, three types of goals are delineated:
1. mastery goals (focused on attaining competence)
2. performance-approach goals (focused on attaining normative competence, i.e. being competent as seen by others)
3. performance-avoidance goals (focused on avoiding normative incompetence).

It is unclear why Elliot and Church do not define a logical fourth category: mastery-avoidance goals. These would be goals focussed on avoiding incompetence as judged by oneself. From a meta program perspective, there is no reason to leave this fourth category undefined.

What’s the same and what’s different?
When we compare the towards and away from meta programs with mainstream conceptualisations of approach avoidance and achievement motivation, we see the following similarities and differences.

a. The towards/away distinction in meta programs is practically synonymous with the approach/avoidance distinction. ‘Moving towards a desired stimulus’ and ‘moving away from an undesired stimulus’ could actually serve as definitions of ‘towards’ and ‘away from’ thinking.

b. In goal achievement motivation theory two hierarchical levels are distinguished:
– global motivational disposition and
– specific goals.
The meta programs towards and away from do not make that distinction. This difference is, however, closely related to another set of meta programs: general versus specific. In terms of meta programs a global motivational disposition would be coded als ‘towards plus general’ or away from plus general’, while specific goals would be coded as ‘towards plus specific’ or away from plus specific’.

c. Something similar can be said about the three types of goals motivation theory:
1. mastery goals
2. performance-approach goals
3. performance-avoidance.
The meta programs towards and away from do not, in and of themselves, distinguish between mastery and performance. This difference is however closely related to yet another meta program: internal reference (using your own judgement), versus external reference (relying on other’s judgements). In terms of meta programs a mastery goal word be coded as ‘towards plus internal reference’, a performance-approach goal would be coded as ‘towards plus external reference’ and a performance-avoidance goal would be coded as ‘away from plus external reference’.

d. The fourth combination of approach/avoidance plus mastery/performance, omitted by Elliot and Church (1997) would be mastery-avoidance goals. In terms of meta programs these would be coded as ‘towards plus internal reference’. This would be: wanting to avoid the negative feelings about oneself when perceiving oneself to be incompetent at some task.

e. When motivation theorists add the mastery/performance distinction to their model, they are limiting the context to tasks. The meta programs towards and away from are not limited to tasks, just as the approach/avoidance distinction is not.

Is Proactive the same as Extraverted?

Meta programs and personality theories
Meta programs are assumed to be variable depending on the situation. This is quite different from ‘personality’ which is supposed to be stable over time and contexts. Lately I have been starting to wonder whether the whole concept of personality isn’t doing us more harm than good. But that is something I will address elsewhere. All I will say here is: give uncle John four glasses of whiskey and see how stable his ‘personality’ is…

In spite of all this, meta programs  show similarities with types or traits or factors from personality theories. When we are looking for relationships between meta programs and concepts in mainstream science, we end up, whether we like it or not,  in the realm of personality.

Clarification by contrast
The good thing is, that when we describe the similarities and differences between meta programs and personality- or behaviour traits, we clarify the definition of our meta program concepts by contrast. I have started to do that for a scientific article on MindSonar.

Theory, concept, measurement
Why is this clarification even necessary? When we want to communicate with the scientific world, we need to explain where our concepts (meta programs, in our case) come from. The scientific model for psychological measurement is: 1. You have a theory, 2. From this theory you derive traits or qualities, 3. You measure those, 4. You use statistics to evaluate how well you are measuring your concepts.

For instance: your theory is that eating a lot of sugar makes people nervous. From this theory you derive the concept of ‘nervousness’. And then you devise an instrument, like a questionnaire, that measures this ‘nervousness’. If your measurement doesn’t work well (judging from the statistics), you go back to the theory for ideas on how to improve it.

NLP is no theory
And here we run into an obstacle: NLP is not a theory. NLP is a collection of presuppositions, skills and techniques. These were derived by observing effective therapists, not from studying scientific research. So when we want to communicate with scientists, we have no theory that connects our concepts and shows us why these concepts are important.

The origins of the Graves concepts are clear, the origins of the meta program concepts have been largely lost in the mists of time. In NLP, sequences of sensory experiences (‘inner strategies’) were originally referred to as mental ‘programming’. Sometimes patterns common to several different inner strategies of the same person were noted during change work. These distinctions were ‘meta’ to mental programming, hence the name ‘meta programs’. The NLP literature does not offer any theories with explicit definitions of these distinctions or statements as to why they are important, how they fit together or what other concepts they are related to. It is my impression that these are distinctions that were popular in the therapy and personal growth culture of California in the 1980’s. They could be said to represent ‘crowd wisdom’ from that era. They were assimilated into NLP by Bandler and later formalised by Cameron-Bandler (1985).

Explaining how meta programs are similar and different
So we cannot point to any theory to explain why we think meta programs are important and useful distinctions. But what we can do, in order to communicate with scientists, is to take concepts from mainstream science and explain how meta programs are similar to and different from these known concepts. As I mentioned, these concepts are mainly personality traits.

Proactive
Let’s have a look at Proactive versus Reactive. There is actually something in mainstream science called ‘proactive behavior’. So this is our obvious starting point. Bateman and Crant (1999) describe a type of behaviour they call ‘proactive’, defined as: ‘to intentionally and directly change things in an intended direction’. They also describe the lack of this proactive behaviour, but they do not give it a label. Similarities and differences with the proactive/reactive dimension in meta programs are:

Comparison with mainstream ideas about proactivity
– Both Bateman and Crant and meta programs highlight taking the initiative as an important element of proactivity.

– Bateman and Crant focus on behaviour, meta programs focus on thinking style (patterns of cognition and experience).

– In their definition, Bateman and Crant include the result of the behavior: ‘change things for the better’. Meta programs do not assume that proactive behaviour will change things for the better. Proactive behaviour may change things for the worse. Think of someone who quickly lights a fire to get warm and doing so, sets the house on fire.

– Bateman and Crant include several behaviors under ‘proactivity’ that in meta programs are considered to be expressions of other meta programs:

a. ‘Scanning for (…) opportunities’ would be coded in meta programs as ‘Options’, not necessary proactive. Someone may scan for opportunities in their mind without ever acting upon them.

b. ‘Setting effective change-oriented goals’ would be coded as ‘Towards’ and ‘Change’ in terms of meta programs. Someone may be aware of what they would like to change, without ever acting upon those ideas.

c.’To do different things or do things differently’ would be coded as an effect of the ‘Change’ or ‘Development’ meta programs.

– Bateman and Crant seem to strongly favour proactivity over ‘no proactivity’. In meta programs, the opposite of ‘Proactive’ is ‘Reactive’: needing more time and information before starting an activity. Meta programs assume there are advantages to reactivity in many situations, be they private or work place. Proactive spending f.i., may bankrupt a company, which could have been prevented by reactive thinking.

– Summarizing: Both Bateman and Crant and meta programs highlight taking the initiative as an important element of proactivity. Differences are: Bateman and Crant focus on behavior, include the result of the action and seem to strongly favour proactivity. Meta programs, in contract, focus on thinking, do not include the result of the action and favour proactivity and reactivity equally. Also Bateman and Crant include many elements in their definition that are covered by meta programs other than ‘Proactive/Reactive’.

The Big Five
The five-factor model, or Big Five model, is a trait oriented personality typology, based on relationships within descriptors of common language. It suggests five broad dimensions commonly used to describe the human personality (Saucier and Goldberg, 1996). The five factors are:

1. Openness to experience (inventive/curious vs. consistent/cautious).

2. Conscientiousness (efficient/organised vs. easy-going/careless).

3. Extraversion (outgoing/energetic vs. solitary/reserved).

4. Agreeableness (friendly/compassionate vs. challenging/detached).

5. Neuroticism (sensitive/nervous vs. secure/confident).

Extraversion
Of the Big Five, the ‘Extraversion/Introversion’ factor seems most strongly related to the ‘Proactive/Reactive’ meta program. This factor is defined as: “The tendency to seek stimulation in the company of others, and talkativeness. Low extraversion causes a reserved, reflective personality. Extroverts draw energy from interacting with others, while introverts get tired from interacting with others and replenish their energy from solitude. People high in extroversion are comfortable with others, gregarious, and prone to action rather than contemplation (Lebowitz, 2016a). People low in extraversion are more likely to speak less, be quiet, introspective, reserved, and thoughtful.”

The traits associated with extraversion are:SociableAssertiveMerryOutgoingEnergeticTalkativeArticulateFun-lovingAffectionateFriendlySocially confident

– Both the ‘Extraversion/Introversion’ factor and the ‘Proactive’ and ‘Reactive’ meta programs define Introverted/Reactive as more introspective and thoughtful. Big Five theory would by contrast see Extraverted as less introspective and less thoughtful as do meta programs.

– Both typologies see ‘Extraverted/Proactive’ as prone to action rather than contemplation, and consequently ‘Introverted/Reactive’ as prone to contemplation rather than action.

– Both typologies see Extraverted/Proactive as drawing energy from overtly doing something (interacting with others, in the case of Big Five).

– A difference is, that the ‘Extraversion/Introversion’ factor is focussed on one single context: social interaction, while the meta programs ‘Proactive’ and ‘Reactive’ may be applied to any context. Opening a door, to give one non-social example, may be done proactively (by immediately turning the handle or kicking the door) or reactively (by first thinking about the way the lock works and what might be behind the door).

– Another difference is that, when we look at the list of traits that are part of extraversion, there are several traits that would be coded as different meta programs. ‘Sociable’ would be not be coded as ‘Proactive’ but rather as the meta program ‘People’. ’Friendly’ would be coded as the meta programs ‘Matching plus People’.’Merry’ would be coded as ‘Matching plus Kinesthetic’. ‘Assertive’ would be coded as ’Proactive plus Towards plus Internally Referenced’. This set of traits being part of the ‘Extraversion’ dimension, makes it much less specific than the meta program ‘Proactive’.

– Summarising
Both ‘Extraverted’ and ‘Proactive’ are characterised by being prone to action, and their opposites ‘Introverted’ and ‘Reactive’ as being prone to contemplation. A difference is that ‘Introversion’ contains a broad set of traits that are covered by other meta programs (or meta program combinations) than ‘Proactive/Reactive’.

How do Criteria, Values, Meta Programs and Graves Drives Fit together?

Standards
Let’s start with criterion. This is actually the broadest concept of the four.  Criteria are standards by which we evaluate things. When you meet someone new, you may be using ‘happy’ as a criterion for evaluating the other person. Do they look happy? Great! Do they look unhappy? Not so good.

Values
Values are criteria too, but they are very important criteria. ‘Honesty’ might be a value when you meet someone new. Sometimes these very important criteria are called ‘core values‘. If someone you meet doesn’t seem very happy, you may find that not so good, but even though happy is a criterion for you, you might not worry about it too much. But if they strike you as dishonest, you might think twice about meeting them again. There is a sliding scale between ‘Criterion’ on the one end and ‘Value’ on the other end. As a criterion becomes more and more important, at some point we call it a value. So when we ask ‘What do you find most important in this situation?’ we are asking you to give a value.

Meta Programs
Meta Programs are ways in which you handle your values. For instance: are you presupposing people will be honest (meta program: matching) or are you presupposing they will be dishonest (meta program: mismatching)?

Graves Drives
Graves Drives are a typology of criteria. In MindSonar we ask you to indicate, for each of your criteria, which Graves drives they are related to most. For example: is honesty about power for you (red drive)? Or is it about community (green drive)? If somebody else had ‘Openness’ as a value, would that be similar to honesty or not? We can’t know  from looking at the words ‘honesty’ and ‘openness’. But if we know that two people both categorise their (differently labeled) values in the same Graves Drive, we know that their values are similar.

Categorizing Criteria
The American psychologist Clare W. Graves theorized that there are eight value systems, which evolved over the course of human history. He assumed that each value system flows from the previous one as a response to:
a. Ever more complex life circumstances
b. Problems with the previous set of values.

MindSonar measures the extent to which your criteria are associated with seven of the eight Graves Drives. We call this ‘Graves categorisation’: putting your criteria (which you already described) into one or more Graves categories. This makes it possible to compare criteria between you and other people or between yourself in different situations.

Graves
Clare W. Graves was a professor of Psychology in the sixties and seventies of the 20th century at Union College in New York, the same university where Abraham Maslow taught at the time.

Maslow was developing his motivation theory (Maslow’s pyramid of needs), which shows the development of individual needs. The highest level of Maslow’s hierarchy, ‘self-actualization’, fit right in with the prevailing views of the seventies.

Graves thought this model did not offer a broad enough base for understanding man as a bio-psycho-social-cultural being. He assumed that human behaviour was not determined by individual needs alone, but by a combination of social, biological and psychological factors. Graves theorized that there are eight value systems which evolved over the course of the past 100,000 years of human history. Graves called these value systems ‘Levels of existence’.