Internal and External Reference, what is the Link with Innovation?

As you know, the meta program ‘internal reference’ is defined as: using one’s own standards in evaluations. ‘External reference’ is using other people’s standards in evaluations. What are some concepts from mainstream science that this distinction is related to?

Internal and external frames of reference in the academic self-concept
An ‘Internal/External frame of reference’-concept used in the study of academic self-concept (Marsh, 1986). When students gauge their academic self-concept by comparing their ability in a given area with the ability of their peers, this is called ‘external comparison’. When they compare their ability in one area with they own ability in other areas, that is called ‘internal comparison’.

Adaptation/Innovation
The meta programs internal reference and external reference, are also related to the ‘Kirton Adaption–Innovation (AI) continuum’ of cognitive style (Kirton, 1987). Messick (1976) defines cognitive style broadly as “consistent individual differences in preferred ways of organising and processing information and experience” (p. 5). Kirton (1999b) defines cognitive style more narrowly as the preferred style with which the individual undertakes problem solving and creativity. He asserts that cognitive style is highly resistant to change. The Kirton Adaption-Innovation (AI) continuum of cognitive style ranges from more adaptive preferences for creativity, decision making, and problem solving at one end, to more innovative preferences at the other. Kirton (1994) describes people with more adaptive preferences as being seen by others as more precise, sound, reliable, disciplined, and dependable. They are more concerned about how things get done – the means. They tend to accept the given problem definition and are more concerned with resolving problems rather than finding them. People with more adaptive preferences will generally focus on change that promotes incremental improvement, perfecting existing systems or “doing things better.” Kirton (1994) described those with a more innovative preference as being seen as unique, visionary, and ingenious. Those with a more innovative preference prefer to challenge the definition of the problem by manipulating and questioning existing assumptions. They may be seen as undisciplined and the kind of change on which they focus is perceived as more radical and often described as breakthrough. When these characteristics are operating together, more innovative people will generally prefer changing the existing system or “doing things differently.”

Focussing on others, but doing what?
When we compare the internal and external reference meta programs with Marshes (1986) Internal/External frame of reference and the Kirton Adaption-Innovation continuum, we see the following similarities and differences.

a. What the internal/external reference distinction in meta programs shares with Marshes Internal/External frame of reference model, is that in both distinctions there is a focus on self (internal reference) in one case, versus a focus on others (external reference) in the other.

b. There is also an important difference. In a comparison there are two elements: observation and evaluation. When a student compares themselves with their peers in Marshes model, they are observing others. But when they evaluate their own capability, comparing themselves with these others, they are using their own standards. If they were displaying the meta program ‘external reference’ in that situation, they would be using the standards of their peers. They would be measuring their own performance against what their peers found to be a good standard, not even necessarily observing the ability of their peers.

Summarising: Both Marshes internal/external frame of reference-concept and the internal/external reference meta programs distinguish – in a broad sense – between focus on self and focus on others. A major difference is that in Marshes model people using an external frame of reference use their own standards to evaluate their performance, while with the external referenced meta program they use the other person’s standards.

Many other meta programs in Kirton’s AI distinction

c. Looking at the Kirton Adaption–Innovation continuum, people with adaptive preferences, certainly sound more externally referenced, while people with innovative preferences clearly seem more internally referenced in terms of meta programs. Adaptive preferences are characterised by “accepting the given problem definition”. In that regard they are externally referenced: accepting the judgement of other as to what the problem is. People with innovative preferences are described as challenging the definition of the problem … and questioning existing assumptions. These are definitely internally referenced qualities.

d. But as with other concepts we have discussed in this series, Kirton’s adaptive and innovative preferences also harbour many elements that would be coded as other meta programs.
– ‘Being precise’ would be coded as ‘specific’
– ‘Reliable and disciplined’ would be coded as ‘procedure’
– ‘Undisciplined’ would be coded as ‘options’
– ‘Concerned about how things get done’ would be coded as ‘procedure’ too
– ‘Resolving problems’ would be coded as ‘away from’
– ‘Incremental improvement’ would be coded as ‘development’
– ‘Radical change’ would be coded as ‘change’
– ‘Visionary’ would be coded as ’change plus general plus visual’.
So apart from the internal/external reference distinction, Kirton’s distinction also seems to make use of the ‘general/specific’, ‘options/procedure’ and ‘maintenance/development/change’ meta programs.

e. Another difference is that Kirton sees cognitive style as ‘highly resistant to change’, while meta programs are presupposed to be different in different contexts, which also presupposes that they may often change quite easily.

Summarising: We recognise internal/external reference elements in Kirtons adaptive/innovative distinction. Apart from these two meta programs, we also recognise several other meta program distinctions, like ‘general/specific’ and ‘options/procedure’.

Towards and Away from, what does Motivational Theory say?

This is an article in the series on comparisons between meta programs and concepts in mainstream science. Today we will talk about ‘towards’ versus ‘away from’. As you probably know, the meta program ‘Towards’ is defined as a focus on achieving goals, while its opposite ‘Away From’ is defined as a  focus on avoiding problems.

Approach and avoidance
Concepts related to ‘Towards/Away from thinking’ are ‘Approach/Avoidance’ motivation and ‘Goal Achievement Motivation’. Both have a long history in science. Models of Goal Achievement Motivation tend to offer a more fine grained view of motivation than the simple ‘Towards’ versus ‘Away from’ distinction. Although Atkinson (1957) does remark that “achievement motivation and fear of failure may be defined simply as the generalised desire to succeed and the generalised desire to avoid failure, respectively”. So theoretically speaking it looks like we have the basics covered with our meta programs.

Democritus
The distinction between approach and avoidance motivation can be found in ancient Greek philosophy. The ethical hedonism of Democritus (460-370 BC) and Aristippus (430-360 BC) proscribed the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the primary guide for human conduct (Elliot, 1999). In psychology, few phenomena are more fundamental than approach and avoidance motivations, which have been implicated in a wide range of psychological processes (e.g., Cacioppo 1999; Elliot & Church, 1997; Higgins, 1997) and are shared across a diverse array of species (Elliot, 1999).Approach and avoidance motivation “is composed of three … components. Approach indicates a propensity to move toward (or maintain contact with) a desired stimulus. Avoidance indicates a propensity to move away from (or maintain distance from) an undesired stimulus. Motivation is defined as the energization and direction of behavior. The valence of stimuli is at the core of the distinction between approach and avoidance, with positively valenced stimuli typically leading to approach and negatively valenced stimuli typically leading to avoidance. Stimuli can be external or internal, implicit or explicit, conscious or non-conscious.” (Seel, 2012).

Hierarchical models
Goal Achievement Motivation is often seen as having two hierarchical levels. In the beginning of the last century McDougal (1908, 1932) linked specific ‘Desired goals’ to more generalised ‘Preferences’ (initially called ‘instincts’). Personality theorists later proposed hierarchical models of motivation in which goal concepts (Pervin, 1989) are seen as concrete representations of more abstract ‘motivational dispositions’ (Cattell, 1957; Emmons, 1989; McClelland, 1951; Murray, 1938; Nuttin, 1984; Rotter, 1954). In this tradition, goal concepts are situated between global motivational dispositions and specific behaviors. Goal concepts are the direct regulators of behaviour, and motivational dispositions have an indirect influence.

The difference between performance and mastery
Later motivation theorists (Elliot, 1994, 1997, Elliot and Church, 1997) have taken into account the distinction between ‘performance motivation’ and ‘mastery motivation’. In setting performance goals, people focus on demonstrating their competence to others. In setting mastery goals, they focus on improving their competence for the sake of feeling competent. Combining approach/avoidance motivation with performance/mastery motivation, three types of goals are delineated:
1. mastery goals (focused on attaining competence)
2. performance-approach goals (focused on attaining normative competence, i.e. being competent as seen by others)
3. performance-avoidance goals (focused on avoiding normative incompetence).

It is unclear why Elliot and Church do not define a logical fourth category: mastery-avoidance goals. These would be goals focussed on avoiding incompetence as judged by oneself. From a meta program perspective, there is no reason to leave this fourth category undefined.

What’s the same and what’s different?
When we compare the towards and away from meta programs with mainstream conceptualisations of approach avoidance and achievement motivation, we see the following similarities and differences.

a. The towards/away distinction in meta programs is practically synonymous with the approach/avoidance distinction. ‘Moving towards a desired stimulus’ and ‘moving away from an undesired stimulus’ could actually serve as definitions of ‘towards’ and ‘away from’ thinking.

b. In goal achievement motivation theory two hierarchical levels are distinguished:
– global motivational disposition and
– specific goals.
The meta programs towards and away from do not make that distinction. This difference is, however, closely related to another set of meta programs: general versus specific. In terms of meta programs a global motivational disposition would be coded als ‘towards plus general’ or away from plus general’, while specific goals would be coded as ‘towards plus specific’ or away from plus specific’.

c. Something similar can be said about the three types of goals motivation theory:
1. mastery goals
2. performance-approach goals
3. performance-avoidance.
The meta programs towards and away from do not, in and of themselves, distinguish between mastery and performance. This difference is however closely related to yet another meta program: internal reference (using your own judgement), versus external reference (relying on other’s judgements). In terms of meta programs a mastery goal word be coded as ‘towards plus internal reference’, a performance-approach goal would be coded as ‘towards plus external reference’ and a performance-avoidance goal would be coded as ‘away from plus external reference’.

d. The fourth combination of approach/avoidance plus mastery/performance, omitted by Elliot and Church (1997) would be mastery-avoidance goals. In terms of meta programs these would be coded as ‘towards plus internal reference’. This would be: wanting to avoid the negative feelings about oneself when perceiving oneself to be incompetent at some task.

e. When motivation theorists add the mastery/performance distinction to their model, they are limiting the context to tasks. The meta programs towards and away from are not limited to tasks, just as the approach/avoidance distinction is not.

MindSonar – a good Tool for Coaching Artists

Previously, I’ve used MindSonar for business people and for individuals seeking coaching or therapy. Recently however, I’ve been thinking about the use of MindSonar for artists of various types. This arose out of my own personal experience. In the last couple of years I’ve developed hobbies in both art and jewellery making. As a result, I now know a number of incredibly creative people. As a person whose background is in science, this is quite a new experience for me and one which I’m enjoying learning from. As a MindSonar professional, I can’t help but notice how the different thinking styles of individual artists impact upon their work. For example, some artists produce works which are realistic representations of the subject, having focussed on the Specific details, whereas others produce representative works which are impressionistic or even abstract having focussed on the General appearance. Similarly, some spend a lot of time on the preparation and design before getting around to making a piece (Reactive). Others dive straight in and create as they go along (Proactive).

Such differences in the thinking styles they employ within the creative process can impact upon their success when they come to develop their work by using different media. I have encountered this myself when recently I decided to move from drawing with soft pastels (which can used to draw pictures quite quickly – ideal for those of us who are proactive) to using coloured pencils instead (which require more planning and the need to take a longer to build up layers of colours). Starting from my “pastel mindset” of Proactive, I initially found the switch frustrating. However, by changing my perspective and moving into a slightly more Reactive thought pattern, I began once more to enjoy the process.

The thinking style around creative work also impacts on the artist when they decide to advertise and sell their work. As a rule of thumb, artworks which arise from a Reactive and Specific approach take more time to create than those resulting from a Proactive, General approach. This then impacts on the artist’s pricing structure for their pieces.

The implications for MindSonar professionals is to consider how we might work with artists who are looking for coaching to help them develop either their art or their business. An artists who feels that they are not progressing as well as they want to could be helped to identify whether they would be helped by changing their balance of Specific to General in the context of their work: strengthening general if they are aiming to be more abstract, or their Specific if they wish to do more detailed, realistic works. If an artist spends so long planning and designing that they create only sporadically, they might benefit from strengthening their Proactive metaprogramme.

There will, of course, be other metaprogrammes at play in a person’s creativity and I’ll be looking out for them the more I spend time within the creative communities to which I now belong. In particular, I’m interested in those artists who have achieved a balance which enables them to be commercially viable whilst still doing the style of art they enjoy. If you coach creative people, or are an artist of any sort yourself, let me know which thinking styles you notice as you work. I think there’s real scope for MindSonar to be helpful in this area.